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A CONTROL AND AUTOMATION ENGINEERING APPROACH TO 
RAILWAY INTERLOCKING SYSTEM DESIGN 
SUMMARY 
Despite the high initial costs of railway constructions, railway systems are more 
economic, safer and more environment friendly than other ways of transport. 
Notwithstanding all these positive features, the investments in Turkey had been 
rather limited in comparison with other European countries until recent years. A need 
for reducing the dependency to other countries has arisen in line with the 
development in railway transportation after a visible increase in the investments on 
railway sector in recent years. Owing to high costs and problems in adaptation, 
development of local signaling systems has been required by TCDD. As a result, the 
first signaling system has been developed by the partnership of TCDD, TUBITAK 
and ITU. 
 
The most important component of railway systems that enables a safe transportation 
is interlocking. The safety basis of developing an interlocking system is described by 
standards developed by international committees like CENELEC. In order to provide 
the required SIL, using these techniques, methods and architectures has a great 
importance. Besides the international safety standards, the needs and safety rules of 
the country where the signaling system to be applied have to be considered. 
 
In this thesis, functional safety requirements related to fixed-block railway signaling 
systems are described, and formal modeling methods and software architectures used 
for a minimum SIL 3 railway interlocking system has discussed in detail. In 
particular, some of the problems that arise in using the diverse programming 
technique, which is used in developing failsafe software, have been determined and 
solution methods to these problems have been proposed.  . 
 
Besides fixed-block signaling systems, moving-block signaling systems are also 
explained within the thesis. The implementation levels of European Rail Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS) are explained, and application of an online adaptive 
controller design method that guarantees the trains to follow each other within safe 
distances is proposed. 
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DEMİRYOLU ANKLAŞMAN SİSTEM TASARIMINA KONTROL VE 
OTOMASYON MÜHENDİSLİĞİ YAKLAŞIMI 
ÖZET 
Demiryollarının ilk inşaat maliyetleri oldukça yüksek olmasına rağmen diğer ulaşım 
sistemleri ile karşılaştırıldığında, demiryolu sistemleri daha ekonomik, güvenli ve 
çevrecidir. Tüm bu özelliklerine rağmen, diğer Avrupa ülkeleri ile karşılaştırıldığında 
yakın zamana kadar Türkiye’de demiryollarına yapılan yatırım oldukça kısıtlı 
kalmıştır. Son yıllarda demiryolu sektörüne yapılan yatırımların gözle görülür bir 
şekilde artmasıyla gelişimi hız kazanan demiryolu ulaşım sistemlerinde dışarıya 
bağımlılığın azaltılması gündeme gelmiştir. 
 
Bu bağlamda gerek uyum ve güncelleme sıkıntıları gerekse yüksek maliyetler nedeni 
ile yerli sinyalizasyon sistemlerinin geliştirilmesi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet 
Demiryolları (TCDD) tarafından bir ihtiyaç olarak belirtilmiştir. Bunun bir sonucu 
olarak Türkiye’nin ilk yerli demiryolu sinyalizasyon projesi TCDD, Türkiye Bilimsel 
ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu (TÜBİTAK) ve İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi (İTÜ) 
ortaklığında tamamlanarak TCDD’ye teslim edilmiştir. 
 
Demiryolu sistemlerinde ulaşım ve taşımanın güvenli olarak gerçekleştirilmesini 
sağlayan en önemli bileşen anklaşman (interlock) sistemidir. Anklaşman sisteminin 
geliştirilmesinde izlenilecek olan temel adımlar Avrupa Elektroteknik 
Standardizasyon Komitesi (European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization - CENELEC) gibi uluslararası komiteler tarafınca hazırlanan 
güvenlik standartlarında tanımlanmıştır. 
 
Geliştirilen sinyalizasyon sisteminin istenilen Güvenlik Bütünlüğü Seviyesi (Safety 
Integrity Level - SIL) seviyesini sağlayabilmesi için bu güvenlik standartlarınca 
tavsiye edilen yöntem, teknik ve mimarilerin kullanılması yüksek önem arz 
etmektedir. Uluslararası güvenlik standartlarının gereksinimlerine ek olarak, 
sinyalizasyon sisteminin kurulacağı ülkeye ait ihtiyaçlar ve güvenlik kriterleri de göz 
önünde bulundurulmalıdır. 
 
Yazılım geliştirme süreci başlangıcında yazılımdan beklenen çıktılar veya başka bir 
deyişle yazılım isterleri oluşturulmalıdır. Sonrasında güvenlik standartlarında tavsiye 
edilen yöntem ve mimarilerin istenilen SIL seviyesinin sağlanabilmesi için uygun bir 
şekilde seçilmesi gerekmektedir. Seçilen yöntem ve mimariler yazılım isterlerini 
eksiksiz sağlayacak şekilde tasarımı gerçekleştirecek olan grup tarafından yazılım 
geliştirme sürecinde kullanılmalıdır. 
 
Yazılım geliştirme sürecinde tasarımı gerçekleştirilen yazılım blok ve alt blokları 
(veya modülleri) yazılım test grubu tarafından oluşturulan test prosedürüne göre test 
edilerek doğrulanmalıdır. Test prosedüründe uygulanan adımlar yazılım isterlerini 
doğrulayacak şekilde oluşturmalıdır. Yazılım geliştirme ve test süreçleri eksiksiz 
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şekilde tamamlandıktan sonra doğrulanmış yazılım Fabrika Kabul Testi ve Saha 
Kabul Testleri ile de doğrulanmalıdır. Yazılım testlerinde herhangi bir hata ile 
karşılaşılması durumunda hatalar raporlanmakta ve gerekli düzeltmelerin yapılması 
amacıyla yazılım geliştirme gruplarına sunulmaktadır. Gerekli düzeltmeler 
gerçekleştirildikten sonra tüm testler en baştan tekrar gerçekleştirilmelidir. 
 
Bu tezde, sabit-blok (fixed-block) demiryolu sinyalizasyon sistemlerine ilişkin 
fonksiyonel güvenlik gereksinimleri tanımlanmış ve en az SIL 3 seviyesine sahip bir 
demiryolu anklaşman sistemi tasarımında kullanılan biçimsel modelleme yöntemleri, 
yazılım mimarileri detaylı olarak anlatılmıştır. 
 
Özellikle, güvenlik-kritik yazılım geliştirme sürecinde kullanılan çoklu programlama 
(Diverse Programming, N-version Programming) tekniğinin kullanımında ortaya 
çıkan eşzamanlama (synchronization) problemleri tanımlanmış ve bunlara yönelik 
çözüm yöntemleri önerilmiştir. Karşılaşılan eşzamanlama problemleri tip-1 ve tip-2 
olarak iki farklı gruba ayrılmıştır. Bu iki farklı problem için iki farklı çözüm 
önerilmiş ve programlanabilir mantıksal kontrolörler üzerinde uygulanarak 
doğrulanmıştır. 
 
1800’lü yılların ortalarından bugüne kadar kullanılmakta olan sabit-blok 
sinyalizasyon sistemleri, yolcu ve taşıma yoğunluğun artması, trenler arası yolculuk 
sürelerinin (headway time) gerekenden yüksek olması nedeniyle özellikle metro 
sistemlerinde yerini hareketli-blok (moving-block) sistemlere bırakmaktadır. 
Hareketli-blok sistemlerin en bilinen örneği olan Haberleşme Tabanlı Tren Kontrolü 
(Communication Based Train Control - CBTC) uygulamaları ile mevcut metro ve 
şehir içi demiryolu hatları daha etkin ve verimli bir şekilde kullanılabilmektedir. 
 
Buna ek olarak, farklı Avrupa ülkelerinde uygulanan tren kontrol, sinyalizasyon 
yöntemleri ile güvenlik kriterlerinin tek bir çatı altında toplanması, bu kriter ve 
uygulamaların şehir içi şehirlerarası demiryolu hatlarında da kullanılabilmesi 
amacıyla Avrupa Raylı Ulaşım Yönetim Sistemi (European Rail Traffic Management 
System - ERTMS) tanımlanmıştır. 
 
ERTMS, Avrupa Demiryolu Trafik Kontrolü (European Rail Traffic Control - 
ETCS) ve Demiryolu Mobil İletişim için Küresel Sistem (Global System for Mobile 
communications - Railway - GSM-R) uygulamalarının bir araya getirilmesi 
sonucunda oluşturulmuştur. 
 
ETCS uygulama seviyesi 1 ve 2, ek güvenlik kriterleri getirilmiş olan sabit-blok 
sistemlerdir. ETCS uygulama seviyesi 3 ise seviye 1 ve 2’den farklı olarak hareketli-
blok sistemler olarak tanımlanmaktadır. ETCS uygulama seviye 3’ün en önemli bir 
diğer avantajı ise, sabit-blok sistemlerde kullanılan yol boyu sinyallerin ve ray 
devrelerinin kaldırılmış olmasıdır. Güvenli tren hareketi için gereken tüm bilgiler 
tren üzeri bilgisayar ve trafik kumanda merkezi arasında GSM-R vasıtası 
iletilmektedir. 
 
Sabit-blok demiryolu sinyalizasyon sistemlerinde gerçekleştirilen çözüm ve 
uygulamalara ek olarak, hareketli-blok sinyalizasyon sistemlerinin temel bileşenleri 
ve kavramları da tez kapsamında açıklanmıştır. Hareketli-blok sistemlerde trenlerin 
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birbirini güvenli bir şekilde takip edebilmeleri için göz önünde bulundurulması 
gereken kriterler tanımlanmıştır. 
 
Avrupa Demiryolu Ajansı (European Railway Agency - ERA) ve Uluslararası 
Demiryolu Sendikası (International Union of Railways - UIC) gibi kurumların konu 
hakkında tavsiye ve önerilerine uygun olarak tren frenleme eğrilerinin hesaplanması 
ve güvenli tren takip mesafesi gibi kavramlar da açıklanmıştır. 
 
ERA ve UIC tarafından tanımlanmış güvenli tren takip mesafeleri ve tren frenleme 
mesafeleri göz önünde bulundurularak, ETCS uygulama seviye 3 kriterlerine göre 
aynı demiryolu hattı üzerinde aynı yönde ilerleyen trenlerin birbirlerini güvenli 
olarak takip etmesini sağlayan bir çevrimiçi uyarlamalı kontrolör tasarım yönteminin 
uygulaması önerilmiştir. Önerilen bu kontrolörün doğrulanması amacıyla benzetim 
çalışmaları yapılmış ve kontrolörün doğruluğu gösterilmiştir. 
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1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Railways provide more economical and environmental solutions in spite of the fact 
that their initial costs are relatively high. Among different transportation alternatives, 
for a passenger who travels from Rome to Paris, traveling by train causes less carbon 
dioxide emission and energy consumption as illustrated in figure 1.1 [1]. Researches 
also prove that the lifetime risk of death caused by railways is very low in 
comparison to different transportation alternatives. 
 
Figure 1.1 : Typical emission and energy consumption. 
Such low risk values are ensured by strictly obeying the safety related standards such 
as CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization) standards 
in Europe. For instance, the European standard IEC 61508 [2] is developed for 
functional safety requirements of all kinds of electronic and programmable devices. 
In addition to the umbrella standard IEC 61508, EN 50126 describes the functional 
safety requirements related with all kinds of railway applications where Reliability, 
Availability, Maintenance and Safety analysis (RAMS) are determined. EN 50128 
(similar to EN 61508-3) determines methodologies for building software for railway 
control and applications and EN 50129 (similar to EN 61508-2) defines requirements 
for the hardware of electric, electronic and programmable devices to be used in 
railways. 
Railway systems can be grouped as conventional (fixed-block) railway systems or 
moving-block railway systems. In fixed-block railway systems, the trains are moving 
according to route reservation procedure in fixed-length railway blocks, whereas in 
2 
moving-block railway systems, each train is regarded as a moving-block. Although, 
the use of fixed-block signaling in railway systems reduces the overall capacity and 
increases the headway time of the railway lines, it has been used widely the world 
since mid-1800s. As an alternative, the moving-block railway systems are introduced 
to increase the transportation capacity and to reduce the headway times. ERTMS, 
application level 3 can be given as an example of moving-block railway systems. 
Developing signaling systems for unsignaled railway lines and the renovation of old 
(conventional) railway lines in Turkey has an increasing trend in past few years. 
Development of new railway lines and application of ERTMS are still ongoing. 
Because of these advantages and the rise in population, the demand on railways 
increases day by day. 
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the development process of an interlocking 
system for fixed-block railway signaling systems from the control and automation 
engineering point of view. For this purpose, the basic principles of railway signaling 
systems are explained. At first, the signaling systems are classified in to two main 
groups known as fixed-block and moving-block railway signaling systems. The 
influence of functional safety standards to fixed-block railway signaling systems and 
the use of recommended methods in the Turkish National Railway Signaling Project 
(TNRSP) are examined in the second section of the thesis. Especially, the software 
development process and the use of several programming techniques in 
determination of the software architectures are discussed. In particular, a new voting 
strategy is proposed for the solution of the problems encountered in the development 
of the TNRSP. 
Moreover, basic concepts of moving-block signaling systems are given. The 
movement of trains in a single railway line is studied from the control and 
automation engineering point of view as a velocity and acceleration control problem. 
The use of an online adaptive controller design is proposed to solve this problem. 
Results of simulation studies are given to show the applicability of the proposed 
controller design. 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows; after giving a short introduction, the main 
components of fixed-block signaling systems, related functional safety standards and 
the use of them in TNRSP, signaling software (interlocking software) design, the 
proposed voting strategy, development of interlocking software for a sample railway 
field and system tests are explained in section 2. In section 3, moving-block signaling 
systems and the main concepts of ERTMS is explained. Calculation of train braking 
distance and design of an online adaptive PD controller to control the speed of trains 
are given in section 3. The thesis ends with a conclusion in section 4. 
1.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
The contribution of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
Interlocking software development process and the use of railway related safety 
standards are explained in detail in this thesis. In particular representation of the 
railway field components in a formal way and the steps of the interlocking software 
development process are explained with a case study. 
A new voting strategy related with diverse programming technique is proposed for 
safety-critical systems with binary decisions. Despite its many advantages, a 
disadvantage of the proposed voting strategy is the possibility of occurrence of some 
synchronization problems. A formal approach to determine such problems and 
possible solution methods has been proposed.  
Consideration of the train movements in a single railway line as moving-blocks is 
dealt as a speed and acceleration control problem and the application of an online 
adaptive controller to solve this problem can be considered as another contribution of 
this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
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2.  FIXED-BLOCK SIGNALING SYSTEMS 
2.1 History of the Fixed-Block Signaling Systems 
The main idea of the fixed-block signaling systems is to provide safe travel and 
transportation by keeping trains adequately apart from each other while moving on 
railways. The railway lines (tracks) are divided into fixed-length railway blocks 
where each railway block has an entrance and an end signal. These signals inform the 
train drivers about the occupation of the next railway block. Each railway block is 
permitted to be occupied by only one train at a time. Although there are some 
disadvantages such as the reduction in railway line capacity, fixed-block signaling 
systems are still in use since 1800’s. In the early day when the railway traffic and 
density were not as much as today, railway systems did not need any signaling 
systems. Therefore, the train movements were managed by the help of the railway 
guards. The railway guards stand at the beginning of each railway block and warn the 
train drivers about the obstruction in front of their way [3]. By the development of 
railways in those years, many accidents occurred because of either human (railway 
guards or even drivers themselves) or nonhuman (component malfunctions) errors. In 
order to eliminate all these problems, the first interlocking system installation was 
built in UK 1843 [4]. The need for reliable and safe signaling system is much more 
today than in the past because of high demand and failures while satisfying such 
demands may result in fatal accidents [5]. In addition to mechanical interlocking 
systems where the railway traffic operations were realized by signalboxes manually 
[4], electronic interlocking systems such as SMILE [6], STERNOL [7], ELEKTRA 
[8] and other microprocessor-based systems [9] were also used. Many studies on 
modeling, design and verification of railway signaling and interlocking systems can 
be found in the literature [10-19]. Nowadays, as an alternative way, already certified 
COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) solutions are also available in the market provided 
by private companies [20]. 
Even though the name of the signaling system varies from country to country, the 
basic principles remain almost the same. For instance, the basic principles of the 
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British Absolute Block Signaling (ABS) [21] and the basic principles the North 
American Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) [22] system are very similar to each 
other. The main components used in fixed-block signaling systems are explained in 
the next section.  
2.2 Components of the Fixed-Block Signaling Systems 
The general block diagram of a fixed-block signaling systems is illustrated in figure 
2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 : General block diagram of the fixed-block signaling system. 
2.2.1 The traffic control center 
The Traffic Control Center (TCC) is directly responsible for all train traffic in its 
liability region. Additionally, the scheduling of trains, monitoring of the train 
movements and observing the conditions of the railway field components are under 
the responsibility of the TCC. Since the safe train movements in fixed-block 
signaling systems is mainly relies on route reservation procedures, the responsible 
officers or namely the dispatchers request routes for incoming and outgoing trains.  
2.2.2 The interlocking system 
As given in figure 2.1, the interlocking system receives the dispatcher requests and 
compares these requests with the actual condition of the railway field including the 
situation of the railway field components and the railway traffic. After comparison, 
an incoming request is accepted if all safety criteria are satisfied or rejected. The 
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dispatcher cannot give commands to the railway field components directly. The main 
task of the interlocking system is to ensure safety at all times. 
2.2.3 Point machines (railway switches) 
The point machines (railway switches or turnouts) enable trains to pass from one 
railway track to another. A point machine usually has two positions namely normal 
and reverse. Position of the point machines can be changed from the TCC as long as 
the interlocking system allows such a move. Point machines also take proper 
positions after an incoming route request from the TCC is accepted by the 
interlocking system. An example schematic representation of a point machine is 
given in figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2 : Schematic representation of a railway switch. 
2.2.4 Signals (optical wayside signals) 
In fixed-block signaling systems, the wayside signals are established along the rail 
line on certain locations to inform the train drivers about the next railway block. The 
train drivers have to pay attention to the signals on the right side with respect to their 
direction of movement. Even though the use of colors on signals and the physical 
types of the signals differ from country to country, usually red color means the next 
railway block is occupied, yellow color indicates that the next railway block is free 
but not the railway block after that and green color means at least the next two 
railway blocks are free. Depending on the regional requirements, Turkish State 
Railways uses an additional aspect near station areas. The fourth aspect (a bottom 
yellow sign) designates a line change ahead (so the train should proceed with 
reduced speed on switch regions). Movement of two trains in a single railway line is 
illustrated in figure 2.3 and the definitions and the types of common signals used by 
the Turkish State Railways are given in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 : The types and the definitions of common signals. 
Type of the 
Signal 
Colors and Definitions 
G
R
Y
Y
 
Four-
aspect 
Tall 
Signal 
Green (G) : 
Next two blocks are free; the train can 
proceed. 
Yellow (Y) : 
The next block is free, but the second 
block is occupied. Proceed carefully. 
Red (R) : Stop, the next block is occupied. 
Yellow-Green (YG) : 
There is a turning (a line change 
through a switch or switches) ahead 
and the next two blocks are free. 
Yellow-Yellow (YY) : 
There is a turning ahead and the next 
block is free, but the second block is 
busy. 
Yellow-Red (YR) : 
Proceed very carefully (stop when 
necessary). 
G
R
Y
 
Three-
aspect 
Tall 
Signal 
Green : 
Next two blocks are free; the train can 
proceed. 
Yellow : 
The next block is free, but the second 
block is occupied. Proceed carefully. 
Red : Stop, the next block is occupied. 
G
Y
R
 
Three-
aspect 
Dwarf 
Signal 
Green : 
Next two blocks are free; the train can 
proceed. 
Yellow : 
The next block is free, but the second 
block is occupied. Proceed carefully. 
Red : Stop, the next block is occupied. 
Yellow-Red : 
Proceed very carefully (stop when 
necessary). 
Y
R
 
Two-
aspect 
dwarf 
Signal 
Yellow : 
The next block is free, but the second 
block is occupied. Proceed carefully. 
Red : Stop, the next block is occupied. 
Yellow-Red : 
Proceed very carefully (stop when 
necessary). 
  
 
Note: The dwarf signals are located at the exits 
of secondary lines of the railway fields. They 
indicate that the train will be changing lines 
through a switch (or a set of switches). 
2.2.5 Track circuits and axle counters 
The location of trains in fixed-block signaling systems are detected by the help of 
track circuits or axle counters. These equipment are connected in series depending on 
the length of the railway block because a railway block can contain more than one 
track circuit. When a train enters the railway block, the train axles short-circuit the 
track circuit (see figure 2.4). In this situation, the interlocking system assumes the 
related block as occupied by a train. Turkish State Railways use three different types 
of track circuits such as DC-type, AC-type and Jointless-type track circuits [4]. 
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Figure 2.3 : Movement of trains in a single railway line (fixed-block). 
Alternatively, axle counters can be used to detect the train locations. The counter 
heads of the axle counters are located at the intersection points of the railway blocks 
and counts the train axles. The railway block is assumed as occupied until the total 
number of the incoming and outgoing axles becomes equal. 
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Figure 2.4 : (a) Unoccupied track circuit, (b) Occupied track circuit. 
2.3 Influence of Functional Safety Standards on Fixed-Block Signaling Systems 
The European safety standard [23] defines failure as the termination of the capability 
of a functional unit to provide a required function in any way other than as desired. If 
the results of a failure are vital and may lead to death of many people, systems such 
as industrial plants, air traffic control systems or railway systems can be regarded as 
safety-critical systems [24], [25]. 
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In this context, railway signaling systems are expected to satisfy the 
recommendations of safety related standards such as IEC 61508 where functional 
safety requirements of all kinds of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic 
(E/E/PE) devices. In addition to this umbrella standard, EN 50126 describes the 
functional safety requirements related with all kinds of railway applications where 
Reliability, Availability, Maintenance and Safety analysis (RAMS) are determined. 
EN 50128 (similar to EN 61508-3) determines methodologies for building software 
for railway control and applications and EN 50129 (similar to EN 61508-2) defines 
requirements for the hardware of E/E/PE devices [26].  
These standards also bring out a widely known definition named Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL), which is a discrete level for specifying the safety integrity requirements 
of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems [23]. SIL 
definition is made in [27] for Software SIL as a classification number that determines 
the techniques those have to be applied to reduce software faults to an appropriate 
level and System SIL as a classification number that determines the required rate of 
confidence, separately. As an example, for a SIL 3 system in high demand mode of 
operation or continuous mode of operation [23], average frequency of a dangerous 
failure of the safety function per hour (failure rate - λ) is between 10-8 and 10-7 [28]. 
The corresponding value of the mean time to failure (MTTF) is roughly between 
1000 and 10000 years. In another words, a SIL 3 system is expected to work between 
1000 to 10000 years without falling into the hazardous state. The relation between 
the expected range of failure per hour (λ) and SIL can be seen from table 2.2 [29]. 
Table 2.2 : Relationship between SIL, λ and MTTF. 
SIL High Demand or Continuous 
Operation Mode 
(Range of λ) 
Low Demand Operation 
Mode 
(Range of MTTF) 
4 10
-9
 ≤ λ < 10-8 100000 ≥ MTTF ≥ 10000 
3 10
-8
 ≤ λ <10-7 10000 ≥ MTTF ≥ 1000 
2 10
-7
 ≤ λ <10-6 1000 ≥ MTTF ≥ 100 
1 10
-6
 ≤ λ <10-5 100 ≥ MTTF ≥ 10 
In order to satisfy the desired safety integrity level, several methods and techniques 
are recommended for the software development process. While developing software 
in accordance with the safety standards, the designers should follow the software 
development lifecycle (the V-model) given in figure 2.5 [2]. 
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Figure 2.5 : The V-model. 
As an initial step, the safety requirements of the software and the required SIL of the 
software have to be determined. In addition to the international safety requirements 
such as the train must not pass the signal while it is red, additional safety 
requirements can be determined by the competent authorities which is the Turkish 
State Railways in Turkey. The required SIL for a given system can be determined by 
using the figure E.1, the figure E.2 and the table E.1 in EN 61508-5 [30]. In the 
second step, combination of several recommended software architectures by [27] in 
table A.3 should be chosen in order to provide the determined SIL in the first step. 
Later, related system sub models (the modules) have to be obtained. Suitable 
methods for system modeling according to the determined SIL can be found in table 
A.16 in [27]. 
After modeling, the required components of the safety-critical system, the obtained 
models have to be transformed into code snippets (or software function blocks). 
Later, the developed software have to be tested for verification, validation and 
commissioning. Due to the fact that software development process requires much 
more concentration and work, hardware solutions that have the appropriate SIL can 
be provided using certified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products from the 
market. A case study including the above definitions and the use of techniques and 
measures will be given in detail in the next section. 
12 
2.4 Case Study: Turkish National Railway Signaling Project 
Some of the details and a brief explanation of the Turkish National Railway 
Signaling Project (TNRSP) are given in this section. The use of recommended 
methods and techniques by the railway related safety standards are also discussed. 
Please note that, the safety software developed within the TRNSP will be called as 
the interlocking software. 
As mentioned in section 2.3, as an initial step the interlocking table of the railway 
field is constructed by taking into account the international safety requirements and 
the requirements mentioned by the Turkish State Railways. Interlocking table consist 
of  all routes in the railway field including the entrance and exit signals, their color 
indication information, related point machine positions and other prohibitions [31], 
[32]. A sample railway field and its interlocking table are given in figure 2.6 and 
figure 2.7, respectively. 
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Figure 2.6 : A sample railway field. 
The given railway field in figure 2.6 consist of 2 point machines (1 and 2), 4 three-
aspect tall signals (201, 207, 301, 307), 3 three-aspect dwarf signals (202, 302, 303), 
1 two-aspect dwarf signal (101), 1 four-aspect tall signal (305) and 5 railway blocks 
(ST0, ST1, ST2, ST3, SwT1). For instance, to reserve the route 1 (A-D), the railway 
block SwT1 must be unoccupied; the signals that are in the opposite direction such as 
302 and 202 must be red, the point machines 1 and 2 must be in reverse position. 
After all these conditions are satisfied, the entrance signal of the route 1, signal 305, 
can be yellow-yellow (YY). If another train occupies the railway block ST0, the 
entrance signal 305 will be yellow-red (YR). 
13 
Name Route Number Route Point Machines Incoming Signals
YR - SwT1, ST0 (SwT1)
YG 207 - Y, G
YY 207 - R
YR - SwT1, ST2
G 307 - Y, G
Y 307 - R
YR - SwT1, ST3
YR - SwT1, ST1
G 303 - G
Y 303 - Y, R, YR
YR - SwT1, ST1
G 303 - G
Y 303 - Y, R, YR
YR - SwT1, ST1
1 101, 202, 305
SwT1, ST1
(SwT1)
202
302
SwT1, ST1
(SwT1)
Route 5
(C-A)
ST2-ST1 1, 2 101, 302, 305
SwT1, ST1
Route 4
(D-A)
ST0-ST1 1, 2 202, 302, 305
(SwT1)
Route 6
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Figure 2.7 : The interlocking table of the railway field given in figure 2.6. 
The required SIL is determined by using the risk graph given in [30]. The 
consequence risk parameter (C) can be chosen as CC level for the interlocking 
systems since the system failures can result in death of several people. Similarly, the 
risk parameter (F) is chosen as frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone 
(FB). Since avoiding from hazardous events are possible under certain conditions, 
possibility of falling to avoid hazard risk (P) is chosen as PA and lastly, due to high 
probability of unwanted risk occurrence, probability of the unwanted occurrence of 
risk (W) is chosen as W3. As a result of these observations, the required SIL should 
be at least 3 for the interlocking systems. The SIL determination process can be seen 
from figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8 : Determination of SIL. 
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Among several recommendations of [27], Defensive Programming, Failure Assertion 
Programming and Diverse Programming techniques to achieve a SIL 3 software in 
the TNRSP. The aim of Defensive Programming is to detect abnormal control flow, 
data flow or data values during their execution and react to these in a predetermined 
and acceptable manner [27]. In other words, designer has to put several extra control 
points to check the validity of results and/or variables of the program. For instance, if 
a railway block is occupied, the entrance signal of this railway block cannot be 
yellow or green. Similarly, movement of a point machine must not be allowed when 
its railway block is occupied. Such simple general rules can be checked 
independently, regardless of the current state of the program, just before sending 
output signals to the railway field. 
In Failure Assertion Programming, the key point is to check the initial conditions for 
validity before execution of a command and to check all results after the execution of 
a command while executing safety-critical commands. For example, position of a 
point machine should be checked to ensure correct functioning of the point machine 
before and after a movement request. Similarly, a signal cannot be red and green at 
the same time. If red and green color indications are received from a signal at the 
same time, this must be considered as a failure by the developed software [27]. 
Finally, the aim of Diverse Programming (or namely, N-version Programming) is to 
detect and mask software design faults during execution of a program in order to 
prevent safety-critical failures of the system and continue operation with high 
reliability. The main concept of N-version programming is to develop N-different 
algorithms that have the same input-output specifications built up by N-different 
(ideally non-interacting) workgroups. In other words, while execution of a program, 
N-version programming detects residual software faults to prevent system from 
getting into fatal failures and provides high reliability for execution continuity [27]. 
The outputs of these N-different software versions are then sent to another unit, 
which is usually known as the voter. The voter can be in hardware, software, or both, 
depending on the application requirements [33]. The voter receives outputs of N-
different modules and compares them depending on the voting strategy. Several 
voting algorithms (or strategies) and their comparison can be found in the literature 
[34-41]. If the safe-state of the system is not determined (or if the system is not 
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safety-critical) generalized voting strategies [34], [35] can be used where generally N 
is chosen as 3 (Triple modular redundancy - TMR) [42-44]. In such topologies, the 
voter usually applies the majority (or a weighted average) of the decisions given by 
the modules. Nevertheless, for fail-safe systems, where safety is the most important 
concern, the complete agreement of the modules can be sought before getting into an 
“unsafe” state. Hence, usually N is chosen as 2 [27]. The system gets into safe-state 
and produces predetermined fail-safe output, when there is a disagreement between 
the modules. The use of such a strategy is usually encountered in high level safety 
systems. However, the main disadvantage of this strategy is a considerable reduction 
on system availability, since disagreements between modules, which result in system 
locks, can happen frequently. 
While comparing the incoming responses from the modules two possible strategies 
exist: either all decisions are compared as a whole, or every decision bit can be 
compared separately. If the decisions are compared as a whole the system gets into 
the safe-state (all bits are set to their safe values) when there is an incompatibility 
between the decisions. In contrast, only the bits for which incompatibilities exist are 
set to their safe values in bitwise comparison of the decisions. In this sense, bitwise 
voting strategy based on safe-states of variables can provide higher safety in 
comparison to the bitwise TMR architecture, while providing higher availability rates 
in comparison to the strategies that take the decisions as a whole. 
For instance, in a majority voting strategy with three modules, the voter accepts the 
decision whenever two modules accept it even if these modules give wrong 
decisions. A more realistic example can be given for the interlocking systems. While 
a train is moving on a railway block containing a point machine, the point machine 
must be kept in its position. In the TMR architecture with a majority voting strategy, 
the point machine position can be changed if two modules accept it, which may 
cause the derailment of the train. However, in the proposed bitwise voting strategy, if 
one of the modules denies the position change, the position of the point machine will 
not change due to the safe-state of the position variable of the point machine. More 
information about the proposed bitwise voting strategy will be given in section 2.5. 
The inner structure of the interlocking system given in figure 2.1 can be seen from 
figure 2.9.  
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Figure 2.9 : The general framework of the railway signaling system. 
As mentioned before, the main aim of N-version programming is to develop N-
different algorithms that have the same input-output specifications. Since the fixed-
block signaling systems can be considered as Discrete Event Systems (DES) due to 
having features like non-determinism, asynchronism, event-driven and simultaneity 
in their structures and to achieve the diversity in software design, two highly 
recommended modeling methods for SIL 3 software given in table A.16 in [27] are 
used in TNRSP. Brief definitions about the modeling methods to construct the 
software blocks of the modules given in figure 2.9 and the models of the railway 
field components will be given in subsection 2.4.2.1. 
2.4.1 Automatons as a modeling tool 
A deterministic automaton (or a deterministic finite state automaton), denoted by G, 
is a six tuple [45]: 
0( , , , , , )mG Q f q Q    (2.1) 
where  
 Q : is the set of states, 
 Σ : is the finite set of events, 
 f : Q x Σ→ Q is the partial transition function on its domain, 
 Γ : Q → 2Σ is the active event function, 
 Γ(q) : is the set defined for every state of G and represents the feasible 
events of q,  
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 q0 : is the initial state, 
 Qm : is the set of marked states representing a completion of a given task 
or operation. 
The given automaton by (2.1) is assumed as deterministic because f is a function of 
Q x Σ to Q. In other words, there cannot be two transitions with the same event label 
out of a state. For the nondeterministic automaton the transition function f is a 
function of Q x Σ to 2Q. In such a case, there can be multiple transitions with the 
same event label [45]. In order to apply the method based on the Automaton model, 
first the events have to be identified and a state transition graph have to be obtained 
[46]. An example automaton is illustrated in figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10 : An example automaton. 
For the automaton model given in figure 2.10,  1,2,3,4Q  , 0 1q  , 3mQ  , 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8e ,e ,e ,e ,e ,e ,e ,e  ,  11,e 2f  ,  51,e 3f  ,  22,e 1f  ,  32,e 3f  , 
 42,e 4f  ,  63,e 4f  ,  74,e 1f  ,  84,e 4f  . For more definitions about 
the specifications of the automata modeling method and the use of automatons, the 
reader is referred to [45] and [47]. 
2.4.2 Petri nets as a modeling tool 
A marked Petri net, denoted by PN, is a five tuple [45]: 
0( , ,Pre,Post, , )PN P T W M  (2.2) 
where  
 P : {p1, p2, …, pn}, is the finite set of places, 
 T : {t1, t2, …, tk}, is the finite set of transitions, 
 Pre : P x T → N directed ordinary arcs from places to transitions, 
 Post : T x P → N directed ordinary arcs from transitions to places, 
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 W : Pre, Post → {1, 2, 3,…} weight function on the arcs,  
 M0 : P → N initial marking, 
 P T   and P T  . 
 N is a set of nonnegative integers. 
An example PN is illustrated in figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11 : An example PN. 
For the PN model given in figure 2.11,  1 2 3 4, , ,P p p p p ,  1 2 3 4 5 6, , , , ,T t t t t t t , 
 0 1,0,0,0M  ,           1 2 1 3 2 4 3 6 4 5Pre , ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  ,p t p t p t p t p t , 
            1 1 2 3 3 2 4 4 5 1 6 4Post , ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  ,t p t p t p t p t p t p ,  1 2, 1W p t  , 
 1 3, 2W p t  ,  2 4, 1W p t  ,  3 6, 1W p t  ,  4 5, 3W p t  ,  1 1, 1W t p  , 
 2 3, 1W t p  ,  3 2, 1W t p  ,  4 4, 1W t p  ,  5 1, 1W t p  ,  6 4, 1W t p  . 
For a marking  : 1,2,...M P ,  nM p k  means that the nth place has k tokens 
[48]. A marking M can also be represented by a vector with l elements where l is the 
total number of places. Some basic properties of PNs are as follows [45], [48]: 
1. A transition tk is said to be enabled at a marking M if each input place pn of tk has 
at least  ,n kW p t  tokens, where  ,n kW p t  is the weight of the arc from place pn to 
transition tk, that is,    ,n n kM p W p t  for all  n kp I t . Note that,  kI t  and 
 kO t  represents the sets of input places and output places of transition tk, 
respectively; and if  kI t  , transition tk is always enabled. 
    
    
: , Pre Post
: , Pre Post
k n n k
k n k n
I t p P p t
O t p P t p
   
   
 (2.3) 
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2. An enabled transition may or may not fire (depending on whether or not the event 
actually takes place). 
3. The firing of an enabled transition tk removes  ,n kW p t  tokens from each 
 n kp I t  and adds  ,k nW t p  tokens to each  n kp O t , where  ,k nW t p  is the 
weight of the arc from tk to pn. That is, 
       , ,n n n k k nM p M p W p t W t p     (2.4) 
where  nM p  is the number of tokens in the nth place after the firing of transition 
tk. 
4. A marking Mk is reachable from the initial marking M0 in a PN if there exists a 
sequence of transitions t1t2…tm such that M0[t1>M1[t2> … Mk-1[tk>Mk and  0R M  
denotes the set of all reachable markings from M0. 
5. A Petri net PN is said to be m-bounded if the number of tokens in each place does 
not exceed a finite number m, that is,    0 ,  :k i k iM R M p P M p m     . 
Additionally, PN is safe if it is 1-bounded. 
6. A Petri net PN is said to be deadlock-free if at least one transition is enabled at 
every reachable marking  0kM R M . 
2.4.2.1 Petri net models of the railway field components 
In this subsection, the PN models of the railway field components are explained by 
the help of the railway field given in figure 2.6. It is important to note that, PN 
models given in this section are compact models that just represent the basic 
operational behavior of the railway field components. These PN models can be 
converted to software codes (software blocks) by using several approaches [49-51]. 
Route reservation model of a single route is given in figure 2.12 with the meanings 
of the places and transitions in table 2.3, respectively. 
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Figure 2.12 : Route reservation model of a single route. 
Table 2.3 : Definitions of places and transitions in figure 2.12. 
Places Meaning Transitions Meaning 
pidle Routes are idle trrR Reserve route 
prRdnd Route is denied trirR Route is reserved 
prRrsrv Route is reserving tcrR Cancel route 
prRrsrd Route is reserved tricR Route is canceled 
prRcnc Route is canceling tridR Route is denied 
prRcnd Route is canceled ttrinrR Train in route 
prRocc Route is occupied ttrpsdrR Train has passed route 
prRcdnd Route cancellation is 
denied 
tackcR Route cancellation 
acknowledged 
  tackdR Route denial 
acknowledged 
  tackcdR Route cancellation denial 
acknowledged 
When the dispatchers (trrR) make a route reservation request, the interlocking system 
evaluates the request with respect to the actual situation of the railway field 
components (prRrsrv). If a cancellation request is received before the route is reserved 
(tcrR), the route will be cancelled immediately (prRcnd). After the comparison, if all 
safety criteria are met (trirR) then the route will be reserved otherwise the route will 
be denied (prRdnd). If a cancellation request is received after the route is reserved 
(tcrR), the route cancellation process will be evaluated (prRcnc). Finally, after the route 
is reserved, the route will be released when a train has passed (ttrpsdrR). If a train has 
entered (ttrinrR) the route while it is canceling then the route cancellation process will 
be denied (prRcdnd) and the route will be kept as reserved (prRrsrd). 
Next, a single point machine (PM) model is given in figure 2.13 with the meanings 
of the places and transitions in table 2.4, respectively. A PM can be controlled either 
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manually or by a route request by the dispatchers. After a movement request has 
received (χn or χr) if all safety criteria are satisfied, the PM starts to move from one 
position to another (prn or pnr). As an operational requirement of Turkish state 
Railways, a PM is expected to reach the desired position in 7 seconds. If the PM did 
not reach to desired position (trpnr or tnpnr), this is regarded as an indication fault by 
the interlocking system (pfind). 
pfindpr
prn
pn
pnr
trpl tnpr
tnpltrpr
tnpnr
tmtr
tmtn
trpnr
•
pacc
tacc
tackaccr
tackaccn
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χn
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•
 
Figure 2.13 : A single PM model. 
Table 2.4 : Definitions of places and transitions in figure 2.13. 
Places Meaning Transitions Meaning 
pr PM is in reverse 
position 
tnpl PM left normal position 
pn PM is in normal 
position 
tnpr PM reached to normal 
position 
prn PM is moving from 
reverse to normal 
position 
tackaccn Data congruence fault 
acknowledged to normal 
position 
pnr PM is moving from 
normal to reverse 
position 
tackaccr Data congruence fault 
acknowledged to reverse 
position 
pfind Indication fault tmtn Move PM to normal position 
pacc Data congruence fault tmtr Move PM to reverse position 
pacc_1 Control place for data 
congruence fault 
trpnr PM did not reach to reverse 
position 
χn Movement request to 
normal position 
tnpnr PM did not reach to normal 
position 
χr Movement request to 
reverse position 
tacc Occurrence of data 
congruence fault 
  trpr PM reached to reverse 
position 
  trpl PM left reverse position 
22 
This fault can be overcome by another position request (tmtr or tmtn). Additionally, 
another malfunction occurs when the PM sensors send the position signal at the same 
time (pacc). In this case, the PM sensors should be checked and an acknowledgment 
signal should be sent to the interlocking system after the fault is fixed (tackaccn or 
tackaccr). 
Moreover, the PN models of the signals described in table 2.1 are given in figure 
2.14 with the meanings of the places and transitions in table 2.5, respectively (G-
Green, Y-Yellow, R-Red, YY-Yellow-Yellow, YR-Yellow-Red, YG-Yellow-Green). 
The interlocking system sends color information to the related signals according to 
the interlocking table after the PM(s) took proper positions. All signals in the railway 
field should be red when there is no reserved route. The interlocking system should 
also check the signals in the railway field for possible signal faults. These faults can 
be classified as no color indication fault or multiple color indications fault. In the 
first case, the signal do not show any color information whereas in the latter case, the 
signal shows more than one color information (etc. red and green). When any of 
these faults occur, the interlocking system denies the route request or cancels the 
reserved routes that are related with the faulty signal. These signal faults are not 
mentioned in the signal models to decrease the complexity in the figures. 
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Figure 2.14 : Signal models (Four-aspect tall signal (a), Three-aspect tall signal (b), 
Two-aspect dwarf signal (c), Three-aspect dwarf signal (d)). 
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Table 2.5 : Definitions of places and transitions in figure 2.14. 
Places Meaning Transitions Meaning 
p4tr Signal is red t4tr2y Red to yellow 
p4ty Signal is yellow t4ty2r Yellow to red 
p4tg Signal is green t4tr2g Red to green 
p4tyy Signal is YY t4tg2r Green to red 
p4tyg Signal is YG t4tr2yr Red to YR 
p4tyr Signal is YR t4tyr2r YR to red 
p3tr Signal is red t4tyg2r YG to red 
p3tg Signal is green t4tr2yg Red to YG 
p3ty Signal is yellow t4tr2yy Red to YY 
p2dr Signal is red t4tyy2r YY to red 
p2dy Signal is yellow t3tr2g Red to green 
p2dyr Signal is YR t3tg2r Green to red 
p3dr Signal is red t3tr2y Red to yellow 
p3dy Signal is yellow t3ty2r Yellow to red 
p3dg Signal is green t2dr2y Red to yellow 
p3dyr Signal is YR t2dy2r Yellow to red 
Transition Meaning t2dr2yr Red to YR 
  t2dyr2r YR to red 
  t3dr2g Red to green 
  t3dg2r Green to red 
  t3dr2y Red to yellow 
  t3dy2r Yellow to red 
  t3dr2yr Red to YR 
  t3dyr2r YR to red 
Finally, the PN models of the track circuits are given in figure 2.15 with the 
meanings of the places and transitions in table 2.6, respectively. 
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Figure 2.15 : Railway block model. 
Table 2.6 : Definitions of places and transitions in figure 2.15. 
Places Meaning Transitions Meaning 
ptocc Railway block is occupied ttew Train enters from west 
ptooc_1 Railway block restriction ttee Train enters from east 
  ttefw Train exits from west 
  ttefe Train exits from east 
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Since only one train is allowed to occupy a railway block at the same time, each 
place (ptocc) is restricted by another place (ptocc_1). Trains can enter from west (ttew) or 
east (ttee) depending on their direction of movement. When a train enters to the 
railway block, the token in place ptocc_1 moves to place ptocc by the firing of related 
transitions. It should be noted once again that the PN models given in this section 
only describes the general operation logic of the railway field components. A case 
study about signaling system design for an example railway field will be given in 
subsection 2.5.3 . 
2.5 Voting Strategy 
In this section, the decision-making strategy of the developed interlocking system is 
described. In the TNRSP, the proposed bitwise voting strategy is used where the 
safe-state values of the variables are taken into account but some synchronization 
problems have been encountered. These problems and their solutions are also 
described in detail in this section. 
The safe-state of a variable can be considered as a state that prevents the whole 
system not to fall into a dangerous situation due to that variable. The proposed voting 
strategy (hence the proposed voter) demands the complete agreement of all modules 
to set a variable into its “unsafe” state. The modules given in figure 2.9 are chosen as 
fail-safe programmable logic controllers. It is obvious from figure 2.9 that the voter 
also works as a communication unit between the field, the control center and the 
modules (the modules do not interact with each other and the control center directly). 
A fail-safe communication protocol such as safe-ethernet must be used for 
communication between all components (except for the communication between the 
voter and the control center) and the field. When a request is received from the 
control center (e.g. reserve route x or move switch 1 to its normal position) the voter 
sends this request to the modules concurrently and waits for their reply. After the 
voter receives the responses of the modules, it compares the responses according to a 
table where the safe-state of each variable is defined. The safe-state of each variable 
is determined at the “Software Safety Requirements Specification” level in the V-
model (see figure 2.5) as an initial step before developing safety-critical software. N-
different workgroups then develop their software using these specifications. 
Typically, voters are designed as simple as possible to reduce the probability of 
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possible faults in the voter. In this study, some simple but effective logic is also 
added to the voter as explained below. 
The voter is designed as a state-independent machine. In other words, the decisions 
of the designed voter are independent from its previous decisions. This allows testing 
the voter for all possible inputs. In contrast, the modules are designed as state-
dependent machines, as they have to make decisions depending on the previous 
inputs and states. In general, there can be infinite number of possible evolutions of 
the states in such machines. Therefore, it is usually not possible to test the modules 
for all possible input combinations. Frequently, the modules do not send their 
decisions at the same time due to their cycle times and communication delays. In 
such cases, after the first decision is received from a module, the voter waits along 
for a specified time called as the consistency time for the other module to give its 
decision. If the other module does not give any decision (no output to the voter) then 
the voter produces an error called consistency error. The voter keeps the 
corresponding output in its safe-state when there is an inconsistency. Moreover, the 
module that tries to drive a variable into its unsafe state, cancels its decision upon 
receiving the consistency error for that variable. 
The consistency time is usually determined depending on the cycle times of each 
module and expected communication delays. It is a nice practice to choose the 
consistency time greater than the sum of 2-fold of the communication time, the cycle 
time of the voter and the module with longer cycle time. Assume that the cycle times 
of the modules and the voter are 220ms, 350ms and 100ms, respectively. The 
communication between the voter and the modules are assumed as 300ms. For this 
example, the consistency time should better be selected greater than (600ms + 100ms 
+ 350ms =) 1050ms. 
Similarly, when a module sends its decision after an incoming request from the voter, 
the module waits for a specified time called as the synchronization time for the 
answer of the voter about its decision. If the module does not receive any answer 
back within this time the module rejects the request, and so the voter. It is a nice 
practice to choose the synchronization time greater than the 2-fold of the sum of the 
communication time, the cycle time of the voter and the module with longer cycle 
time, and the consistency time. For the given cycle time values in the previous 
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paragraph, the synchronization time should better be selected greater than ((300ms + 
100ms + 350ms + 1050ms) x 2 =) 3600ms. Actually, the determination of the 
synchronization time also depends on the time constraints of the process under 
consideration. 
The voter demands complete agreement of all modules before getting into an unsafe 
state [46], [52]. In order to move from an unsafe sate to a safe-state, however, 
decision of just one module towards this direction is enough. For instance, reserving 
a route for an incoming train needs more attention and the interlocking system has to 
check several conditions, therefore, reserving a route demands complete agreement 
of all modules. Similarly, keeping a signal color red is safer than the other color 
information, thus, the signal color will always be red unless all modules produce the 
same color other than red. 
If an incoming request is accepted or rejected then the voter sends proper signals to 
the field and informs the control center and the modules about the result. The voter 
also records discrepancies between the modules. The process between the voter and 
the modules can be considered as a kind of handshaking process. This process of 
handshaking brings up the issue of synchronization between the modules, which is 
one of the main problems related with the N-version programming. Normally, the 
voter sends the requests synchronously to the modules. However, the modules 
receive the requests at different times depending on their cycle times and 
communication delays. This may lead a module not to produce an output in time or 
even fall into an irrelevant state, if the design has not been done carefully. In other 
words, synchronization problems between the two modules can occur. To prevent 
from this kind of situations, the voter sends proper signals after it receives a response 
from a module. This allows re-synchronizing the other module, which has not 
produced the expected response in time. There are also some other solutions to such 
problematic cases. 
One possible solution is to wait both modules to recover themselves (each module 
waits until the end of synchronization time for the other module). Another possible 
solution is to operate the modules in an asynchronous manner by using safety 
precautions. 
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2.5.1 Synchronization problems 
A problematic situation can arise if the modules can move into different states 
depending on the order of two incoming events. Consider the case as illustrated in 
figure 2.16, where the state of each module changes from state 0 to state 1 by the 
event e1 and to state 2 by the event e2. If there is a possibility for the modules to 
receive the events in different order, then the modules can move into separate states. 
This kind of problem will be called as the type 1 problem. 
0
e1 e2
1 2
 
Figure 2.16 : The type 1 problem. 
A possible solution to this type of problems is letting each module to change its state 
as shown in figure 2.17a or figure 2.17b. This will resolve the problem since the 
order of occurrence of the events e1 and e2 do not change the resulting state of the 
modules. It should be noted, however, that in this situation, if the event e2 changes 
the state of the modules from state 1 to state 2 and the event e1 changes the state of 
the modules from state 2 to state 1 (see figure 2.17c), this may also cause the 
modules to move into different states depending on the events they receive. 
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Figure 2.17 : Situation where the type 1 problem do not cause any failure (a, b), 
another situation where the type 1 problem causes a failure (c). 
Sometimes the appearance and then the disappearance of a signal occur in a very 
short period of time. This situation may lead one of the modules to change its state, 
while the other module keeping its state. As is illustrated in figure 2.18, the 
occurrence of the event e1 for a very short period of time leads one of the modules to 
state 1, while the other module waits in state 0. In such a case, the modules divaricate 
at the end of the synchronization time. This case especially arises when the event e1 
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depends on internal states of the module (such as time-out situations). This kind of 
problem will be called as the type 2 problem. 
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1
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Figure 2.18 : The type 2 problem. 
2.5.2 Solutions for the synchronization problems 
A possible solution for type 1 problem is to convert the state diagram given in figure 
2.16 to figure 2.17a or figure 2.17b. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to convert 
a model to another one. An alternative way is to add extra states to synchronize the 
modules as given in figure 2.19. 
Before passing to state 2 from state 0, an extra state is added and named as 2A. In 
this solution, the modules have to pass to state 2A before passing to state 2; and they 
can only pass to state 2 by the event e2G, which happens when all modules are in state 
2A. If a module passes to state 2A and receives a signal from the voter indicating that 
the other module passed to state 1 (denoted by the event e1G), it also passes to state 1 
from state 2A. 
0
e1 e2
1 2
0
e1 e2
1 2A
e1G
2
e2G
 
Figure 2.19 : A possible solution for the type 1 problem. 
Additionally, there are two possible solutions for the type 2 problem. The first 
solution proposed for this kind of problem is to take back the module that passes to 
state 1 into state 0 again by the event e2. The second proposed solution is to take a 
module into state 1 from state 0 after receiving a signal from the voter indicating the 
passing of the other module into state 1 (denoted by the event e1G). These solutions 
are illustrated in figure 2.20a and figure 2.20b, respectively. 
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Figure 2.20 : Possible solutions for the type 2 problem. 
A case study about signaling system design for an example railway field including 
these problems and the solutions will be given in the next section. 
2.5.3 Signaling software (interlocking) design for an example railway field 
In this section, signaling software design for the given railway field in figure 2.6 is 
explained. The PN models given in section 2.4.2.1 are used as software main blocks 
and possible synchronization problems given in section 2.5.1 are also discussed in 
detail. By the help of the interlocking table in figure 2.7 and the PN models of the 
railway field components, software blocks can be constructed easily. Since there are 
two PM in the railway field, the interlocking software must include two PM PN 
models. The other railway field component PN models can be added in a similar 
manner. As a result, the interlocking software should include six PN models for the 
route reservations (which are intersecting with each other), two PN models for the 
PMs, nine PN models for the signals and five PN models for the railway blocks. 
Later, the PN models or namely the software blocks must connect with each other 
according to the interlocking table. For instance, while reserving the route 5 (C-A), 
after the PM positions are adjusted (1-reverse position, 2-normal position) the signal 
202 should be yellow when the signal 303 is yellow, red or yellow-red. In other 
words, the output of the PN model of the route 5 should be connected to PN models 
of the point machines 1 and 2, the related signals such as 202 and 303 and the track 
circuits ST1, SwT1 and ST2. The general representation of the interlocking software 
with respect to PN models is given in figure 2.21. The connections of the PN models 
are not given here due to reduce the complexity. As it is obvious from the figure 2.21 
that, as an initial condition, all routes are idle (pidle), both PM s are in reverse 
position, al signals are red and all railway blocks are unoccupied. 
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Figure 2.21 : The general representation of the interlocking software. 
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By an incoming route request (e.g. route A-B) from the dispatcher, the token in 
(pidle) moves to the place (prABrsrv) by the firing of the transition (trrAB). Later, 
the token in the place (pr1) of the point machine 1 PN model, moves to the place 
(prn1) by the firing of the transition (trpl1) after all firing conditions (χn1) are 
satisfied. When the PM 1 reaches to the desired position in a predetermined time 
interval (e.g. 7 seconds), the token in the place (prn1) will pass to the place (pn1) 
over the transition (tnpr1). Otherwise, the token in the place (prn1) will pass to the 
place (pfind1) over the transition (tpnr1) where the interlocking system denies the 
route request A-B due to the indication fault of the PM. 
After the PM reaches to the desired position (pn1), the entrance signal of the route 
will inform the train driver by showing the proper color information according to the 
interlocking table. The entrance signal of the route A-B (signal 305) will be green if 
the next signal in the route (signal 307) is yellow or green; or the entrance signal of 
the route A-B will be yellow if the next signal in the route is red. After the entrance 
signal of the route A-B shows proper color indication, the token in the place 
(prABrsrv) moves to the place (prABrsrd) by the firing of the transition (trirAB). 
This also means that the route A-B is reserved and the railway field components 
related with this route are locked electronically. 
The token in the place (prABrsrd) will also move to the place (prABocc) by the firing of 
the transition (ttrinrAB) after the entrance of the train in the first track circuit (SwT1) of 
the route A-B. After the train exits from the track circuit SwT1, the token in the place 
(ptocc_SwT1) will pass to the place (ptocc_1SwT1) by the firing of the transition (ttefeSwT1). 
In other words, the train reaches to the station 3 (ST3) and the route reservation A-B 
will be terminated by the passing of the token in the place (prABocc) to the place (pidle) 
over the transition (ttrpsdrAB). 
Briefly, in addition to the explanations given above, different requests can be also 
made by the dispatchers. For instance, if a cancellation request is made before a train 
enters in the reserved route, the interlocking software send red color information to 
the entrance signal of the route and then cancels the reserved route immediately. If 
the cancellation request is made after the train enters in the reserved route, the 
interlocking software should deny the cancellation request. The interlocking software 
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is responsible of taking decisions by comparing the requests of the dispatchers and 
the actual situation of the railway field. 
As given in figure 2.9, the requests of the dispatcher are first sent to the voter and 
then to the modules for evaluation. The voter and the modules are chosen fail-safe 
PLCs. After evaluation, each module sends its decision back to the voter. The voter 
gives the final decision by considering both module decisions and the safe-state of 
the request. After that, the voter sends its final decision both to the control center and 
to the modules. In case of the acceptance of the request, the voter also sends its final 
decision to the related railway field components. The data sequence diagram for the 
reservation of the route A-B is given in figure 2.22. 
The final decision is always made by the voter and the voter sends this decision to 
the modules, the control center and the field, if necessary. As mentioned before, the 
voter also takes into account the safe-state of each variable while making its 
decisions. The safe-states of the variables of concern are given in table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 : The safe-states of the variables. 
Variable that has logic “1” safe-state Variable that has logic “0” safe-state 
Route request accepted
*
 Route request accepted
*
 
Route is reserved
*
 Route is reserved
*
 
Cancel route reservation Q_switch_normal_pos
**
 
Route request denied Q_switch_reverse_pos
**
 
Route cancellation is denied Q_signal_Green 
Switch movement is denied Q_signal_Yellow 
Q_signal_Red Route is cancelled 
* Before the route reservation, the safe-states of these two variables are assumed as “0” whereas the 
safe-states of these variables are assumed as “1” after a route is reserved. For example, before 
reservation of a route, the voter demands full agreement from the modules about “route request 
accepted bit”. After the reservation, the voter keeps this bit in “1” as long as at least one module keeps 
it in “1”. 
** In addition to the module decisions, the voter also checks the states of some other bits for the final 
decision. For instance, if the track circuit of a switch is busy, the voter does not change the position of 
the switch even both of the modules agree, and once the movement of the switch is started, due to 
safety-requirements, the voter does not leave the switch in a middle position even if both modules stop 
sending switch movement commands. 
As mentioned above, for the route reservation or moving the PM from one position 
to another, the voter demands complete agreement of the modules. In other words, 
reserving a route is much safer than not to reserve it and similarly, keeping a PM in a 
position is much safer than moving it. 
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Module 2 Module 1 Voter Control Center Field
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B_accept_1
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_A-B_reserved_2
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_request_accept_decision
Q_Signal305_Green_1
Q_Signal305_Green_2
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_1
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
Route_request_to_A-B_accept_2
Q_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decision
Signal305_is_Green
Q_Signal305_decision
Route_A-B_reserved_1
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_2
Route_A-B_reserved_decision
Train has passed 
and the route is 
released
Route_A-B_reserved_decision
Route_A-B_reserved_decision
Train_enters_the_route
Train_enters_the_route
Train_enters_the_route
Train_enters_the_route
Q_Signal305_Red_1
Q_Signal305_Red_2
Q_Signal305_decision
Signal305_is_Red
Train_has_passed_route_A-B
Train_has_passed_route_A-B
Train_has_passed_route_A-B
Train_has_passed_route_A-B
Release_route_A-B
Release_route_A-B
Release_route_A-B_decision
Release_route_A-B_decision
Release_route_A-B_decision
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Assume 
that the 
signal 307 
is yellow 
or green. 
The signal 
305 must 
be green.
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
Q_Signal305_decision
Signal305_is_Red
Signal305_is_Red
Signal305_is_Red
 
Figure 2.22 : The sequence diagram for reservation of the route A-B. 
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According to the definition of defensive programming in [28] (where detection of 
abnormal control flow, data flow or data values during their execution is determined 
and software reacts to these problems in a predetermined and acceptable manner), the 
voter sometimes can give decisions with respect to the decisions of the modules. 
When a train is moving in a railway region containing a PM, the interlocking 
software must not change the position of the PM even both modules are in agreement 
to change the position of the PM. 
Likewise, when a PM has begun to change its position after the complete agreement 
of all modules, the voter has to keep moving of PM until it reaches to its new 
position even if one or all of the modules change(s) its/their decision. Because 
leaving a PM in the middle position is forbidden by the operational conditions and 
safety-requirements of almost all the railways in the worldThe type 1 problem 
mentioned in section 2.5.1 , can be confronted while reserving a route. The route 
cancellation request can be made in any time instance, assume that, a route 
cancellation request is made from the control center after the modules accept the 
route request and send proper signals to the voter. If Module 1 has shorter cycle time, 
then it receives the position indication of the point machine and reserves the route 
before Module 2. If Module 2 receives the route cancellation request in this interval, 
it can cancel the route request before the route is reserved. Briefly, parallel running 
modules divaricate to different states. Sequence diagram of this example can be seen 
from figure 2.23. 
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Module 2 Module 1 Voter Control Center Field
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B_accept_1
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_A-B_reserved_1
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_request_to_A-B_accept_2
Cancel_Route_A-B
Cancel_Route_A-B
Cancel_Route_A-B
Reset
Reset
No output is 
generated by 
the voter!
Consist._error_at_route_reservation
The modules 
are reset!
The modules gave 
different decisions. 
The voter waits for 
the specified 
consistency time
Route_A-B_cancelled_2
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_1
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_2
Q_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decisionQ_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decision PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
Q_Signal305_Green_1
Q_Signal305_Green_2
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
 
Figure 2.23 : An example sequence diagram for the type 1 problem. 
For the sequence diagram given in figure 2.23, the solution given in section 2.5.2 can 
be applied. If a module accepts a request, the voter waits until the end of consistency 
time for the response of the other module and does not send any incoming 
cancellation request to the modules. This is illustrated in figure 2.24.  
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Module 2 Module 1 Voter Control Center Field
Cancel_Route_A-B
Cancel_Route_A-B
Cancel_Route_A-B
Route_A-B_reserved_2
Route_A-B_reserved_1
The route is 
reserved! The route 
cancellation 
procedure 
will be 
applied.
The voter wait for both 
modules and then sends 
the cancelleation 
request
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B
Route_request_to_A-B_accept_1
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_request_accept_decision
Route_request_to_A-B_accept_2
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_1
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_2
Q_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decisionQ_PM1_decision
Q_PM1_decision PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
PM1_is_in_Normal_pos
Q_Signal305_Green_1
Q_Signal305_Green_2
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Q_Signal305_decision
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
Signal305_is_Green
 
Figure 2.24 : The sequence diagram of possible solution for the type 1 problem. 
The type 2 problem can be encountered when detecting the faults of the railway field 
components. Assume that, when a field component malfunction has occurred, the 
module with shorter cycle time detects this fault first and moves into the failure state. 
In this state, the module will reject all incoming requests related with the faulty field 
component, whereas the other module with longer cycle time might not catch this 
fault. Briefly, parallel running modules can divaricate to different states. An example 
sequence diagram for this case is given in figure 2.25. 
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Module 1 Voter Control Center Field
Module 1
Accepts the 
movement 
request
Module 2
No output is 
generated by 
the voter!
Consist._error_at_PM_movement
The modules 
are reset!
Move_PM_X_to_Normal_pos
Move_PM_X_to_Normal_pos
Move_PM_X_to_Normal_pos Both_indications_for_PM_X
Both_indications_for_PM_X
Both_indications_for_PM_X
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_1
Moving_PM_X_denied_2
Module 2
Detects a 
fault
The modules gave 
different decisions. 
The voter waits for 
the specified 
consistency time
Reset
Reset
Both_indications_for_PM_X
 
Figure 2.25 : An example data sequence diagram for the type 2 problem. 
By using the table 2.7 and the solution given in section 2.5.2 , the type 2 problem 
given in figure 2.25 can be solved as follows: If a module detects a failure, it sends 
an identification signal to the voter about the failure. When the voter receives such a 
failure signal from any module, the voter sends proper signals to both modules. This 
signal enables the other module to detect the fault. In such a condition, the module 
that detects the fault by the help of the voter does not change its state and does not 
produce any output related with the faulty situation but give decisions by taking into 
the fault. Therefore all incoming requests from the control center related with this 
faulty component will be rejected by both modules. This is illustrated in figure 2.26. 
Module 1 Voter Control Center FieldModule 2
Module 1
Detects the 
fault by the 
help of the 
module 1
The voter will 
deny the 
movement request
PM_X_fault
PM_X_fault
Moving_PM_X_denied_1
Module 1
Accepts the 
movement 
request
Move_PM_X_to_Normal_pos
Move_PM_X_to_Normal_pos
Move_PM_X_to_Normal_pos Both_indications_for_PM_X
Both_indications_for_PM_X
Both_indications_for_PM_X
Q_PM1_Normal_pos_1
Moving_PM_X_denied_2
Module 2
Detects a 
fault
Pointmachine_X_fault_2
Both_indications_for_PM_X
PM_X_fault
 
Figure 2.26 : The data sequence diagram of possible solution for the type 2 problem. 
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2.6 Testing the signaling software 
Testing signaling software is at least as important as developing it. The related 
standards [2] and [27] provide several guidelines for testing such crucial software. 
Before explaining the signaling software test steps, it is useful to remind that, all tests 
have to be logged and must begin from the very beginning whenever a test step 
failed. In TNRSP, testing of the developed signaling software is achieved in five 
steps. 
2.6.1 Signaling software module tests (Verification) 
Module tests [53] or in other words, testing the developed program modules 
separately as mentioned in the V-model are realized by using the Interlocking Test 
Program (ITP) developed by the Department of Control Engineering of Istanbul 
Technical University (ITU). In this program, a basic simulator is used to imitate the 
signals in real railway field. An automatic testing procedure was applied to each 
signaling software modules which are developed by independent groups (2~3 weeks) 
[46]. 
2.6.2 Signaling software simulator tests (Validation) 
Validation was realized by using a complex software simulator which is connected to 
the signaling software. Simulator was connected to the signaling software through a 
second PLC set using digital I/O modules, and all possible signals in the field are 
imitated by this second PLC. Complex train movements with several stress tests can 
are performed by the software simulator [54]. 
2.6.3 Hardware simulator tests (Commissioning) 
A hardware simulator, which is 1:87 scaled model of the real railway field, is used to 
provide an even more realistic simulation. The signals collected from the model 
railway field are delivered to the developed signaling software using a set of PLCs in 
this simulation model [54]. The hardware simulator was established in the Industrial 
Automation Laboratory of the Control Engineering Department of ITU. 
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2.6.4 Factory acceptance tests (FAT) 
These tests are also realized in the Industrial Automation Laboratory of the Control 
Engineering Department of ITU, under the observation of a group of delegates from 
the Turkish State Railways. The whole system (including the signaling software and 
TCC software, which was developed by TUBITAK) has been validated in these tests. 
2.6.5 Site acceptance tests (SAT) 
The final site acceptance tests are realized by a group of delegates from the Turkish 
State Railways in the real railway field in Adapazarı region in Sakarya, Turkey in 
January, 2012. All the tests are passed successfully. It should also be noted that the 
tests are executed by independent groups and documented carefully as suggested by 
the CENELEC standards. 
2.7 Results and Discussion 
Consequently, while designing an interlocking software, the use of formal methods 
and several software architectures are highly recommended by the railway related 
safety standards to achieve the desired SIL. In this section the use of highly 
recommended methods, design steps and implementation of these methods to fixed-
block signaling systems are discussed. 
An example railway field is also examined to increase the clarity of the definitions. 
The proposed control architecture includes two parallel modules that are supervised 
by a main controller named as the voter. The voter takes into account the safe-states 
of each variable for making final decisions. Moreover, possible deadlocks and 
synchronization problems between the modules due to differences in their cycle 
times and design strategy are determined. Solutions to overcome these problems are 
proposed as one of the main contributions of this thesis. 
A signaling system using this architecture has been realized in Adapazarı region, 
Sakarya, Turkey. Lastly, TNRSP is the first signaling system development project 
for Turkish State Railways and supported by The Scientific and Technological 
Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) with the project number 108G186. 
Additionally, designing signaling software for the fixed-block signaling systems by 
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considering the fault diagnosis approaches can be considered as future works. Fault 
diagnosis approach enables the designers to check the correctness of their component 
models before developing the signaling software. 
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3.  MOVING-BLOCK SIGNALING SYSTEMS 
Since the train movement in conventional railway systems mainly relies on route 
reservation procedure, the trains have to leave at least one railway block between 
them while moving on the same railway line. As a result of this, overall capacity of 
the railway lines are not used efficiently. This is particularly important in metro and 
urban lines. Moving-block signaling system is defined to increase transport capacity 
and reduce headways, where trains including their length and safe braking distances 
are assumed as moving blocks. European Rail Traffic Management System 
(ERTMS) is the combination of European Train Control System (ETCS) and Global 
System for Mobile Communications for Railways (GSM-R) which can be also 
assumed as a standard for safety, signaling and communication system for railways 
across Europe (and also World-wide). ERTMS increases railway capacity, decreases 
energy consumption and optimizes train speeds. Another main purpose of ERTMS is 
to unify different national signaling and train control systems in Europe. In addition 
to European countries, ERTMS is also in use in Mexico, South Korea, China, 
Thailand, Taiwan, Australia and Turkey [55]. 
ERTMS has three application levels from 1 to 3. Application level 1 and 2 can be 
regarded as fixed-block signaling systems with ATS (Automatic Train Stop) and 
ATP (Automatic Train Protection) features [3] whereas the application level 3 is 
considered as moving-block signaling systems [56]. This application level also 
allows reducing headways when compared with fixed-block signaling systems. In 
this section, ERTMS and its application levels, the calculation of the train braking 
distance and the train dynamics are defined briefly and an intelligent adaptive control 
technique is applied to control the speed of a trailing train. 
3.1 European train control system (ETCS) 
ETCS was established by cooperation of railway people in Europe such as UIC 
(International Union of Railways), UNIFE/UNISIG (European Rail Industry / Union 
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Industry of Signaling) and ERA (European Railway Agency). ETCS has mainly 
three application levels as explained in detail below. 
3.1.1 Application Level 0 
If an ETCS equipped vehicle is used on a route without ETCS equipment then this is 
considered as level 0. The national rules and requirements should be obeyed by the 
train drivers.  
3.1.2 Application level 1 
Wayside optical signal lights inform train drivers about the occupation of the track in 
front of them. Train - track communication is achieved over balises (Eurobalise
®
). 
Trains cannot pass the balise as long as the next signal light is red. On-board train 
computer named Eurocab
®
 receives the permitted speed limit (movement authority - 
MA) over balises, compares with the actual speed of the train and calculates the train 
braking distance, if necessary. All essential information is displayed to the driver 
over DMI (Driver Machine Interface) [57]. Track circuits are used to detect the train 
occupation in railway blocks. If the train passes the related balise while the related 
signal light is red, then it will stop automatically by the Eurocab
®
, or if the driver 
does not react in time for a signal change then the train will slow down by its own. 
3.1.3 Application level 2 
In this application level, movement authority is sent to on-board train computer 
directly from a RBC (Radio Block Center) via GSM-R instead of balises. There is no 
need to wayside signals and Eurocab
®
 is always up to date. Balises are used as 
position markers and sends fixed messages such as location and gradient. 
3.1.4 Application level 3 
This level is a kind of a moving-block signaling system. In addition to the optical 
wayside signals, track circuits are also removed to decrease infrastructure 
maintenance and costs. Train itself is considered as a moving-block and allows a 
continuous train movement. Similar to level 2, balises send fixed messages and all 
other information is send directly to on-board train computer over GSM-R. ERTMS 
levels are illustrated in figure 3.1. 
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3.2 GSM for railways (GSM-R) 
GSM-R [58] standard combines all past experiences and key functions from systems 
that used previously in Europe. GSM-R enables communication between RBC and 
trains without any data loss up to very high speeds (500km/h). GSM-R is mainly 
based on EIRENE (European Integrated Railway Radio Enhanced Network) and 
MORANE (Mobile Radio for Railway Networks in Europe) specifications 
determined by UIC [59].  
Balise Groups
ERTMS Application Level 1
Track Circuit
on-board
ERTMS/ETCS
Balise Antenna
DMI
Optical Signals
Interlocking
Balise Groups as 
position markers
ERTMS Application Level 2
Track Circuit
Balise Groups as position markers
ERTMS Application Level 3
Control Center
Train Integrity 
Proving Odometer
on-board
ERTMS/ETCS
Balise Antenna
DMI
Train Integrity 
Proving Odometer
on-board
ERTMS/ETCS
Balise Antenna
DMI
Train Integrity 
Proving Odometer
Interlocking
Control Center
RBC
GSM-R Fixed 
Network
Interlocking
Control Center
RBC
GSM-R Fixed 
Network
 
Figure 3.1 : ERTMS application levels from 1 to 3. 
3.3 Calculating the train braking distance 
In order to prohibit collisions in moving-block systems, trains have to leave adequate 
distance (safe stopping distance) while following each other. In fixed-block signaling 
systems, the length of the railway blocks are fixed and same braking distance is used 
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for all kinds of trains. While calculating braking distance in moving-block systems, 
the factors including the speed of the train when brakes are applied, brake delay time, 
the railway track gradient, the mass distribution of the train and etc. have to be 
considered [60]. For example, for a train with length 410m that has 300km/h speed 
cannot get closer than 4000m to the train in front (if all conditions run perfectly) 
[61]. In ERTMS, the braking curves are also updated depending on the train speed 
and the MAs and Eurocab
©
 always keeps the maximum allowed speed limits by 
communicating with the lineside equipment, interlocking system and etc. [62]. 
MA first uploaded to Eurocab
©
 before leaving the station and while train is moving it 
communicates over GSM-R to the nearest RBC and sends essential information 
(speed, location etc.) about the train. This information is evaluated by the 
interlocking system and then the new MA is sent to the rear train’s on-board 
computer to update the DMI of the rear train. While moving in the railway line, End 
of Authority (EOA) messages could be received depending on the conditions and 
new MAs can be uploaded to trains. 
Every railway line has a permitted speed limit depending on the environmental and 
operational conditions that the driver has to obey while moving in that railway line. 
If the driver increases the train speed and exceeds the permitted speed limit (warning 
limit) a warning will be screened on the DMI. This warning will remain on the DMI 
until train’s speed is equal or below the permitted speed limit. If driver does not care 
the warning limit and keeps the train speed over the limit, the service brake will be 
triggered until the train’s speed is equal or below the permitted speed limit. Another 
speed prevention limit is known as emergency brake limit. If the train exceeds this 
limit, an emergency brake will be triggered until the train’s speed is equal or below 
the permitted speed limit. This prevention is used when the service brake is not 
available or the train passes the EOA [63] (the train has to remain at a standstill until 
a new MA is available). GSM-R network and the communication scheme are given 
in figure 3.2 [62]. 
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Figure 3.2 : ERTMS communication architecture. 
3.3.1 Train braking distance calculation 
As it is mentioned before, several factors including track gradient, mass of train and 
etc. influences the train braking distance. An example calculation including the 
average gradient is given by [60]: 
 2 1 2
1
0
2
maS mU mg h h     (3.1) 
where 
 m : is the mass of the train, 
 a : is the acceleration rate (m/s2) (deceleration is negative acceleration), 
 S : is the stopping distance (m), 
 U : is the speed at which the deceleration began (m/s),  
 h1 : is the height at which the deceleration began (m), 
 h2 : is the height at the stopping point (m), 
 g : is the acceleration due to gravity (9.79 m/s2), 
 α : is the angle of slope. 
For the railway lines, for small α values, tan (α) equals sin (α) and sin (α) is the 
change in height over the stopping distance S. 
     2 1 sin tanh h S S     (3.2) 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) 
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  
2
,  for a < 0
2 tan
U
S
a g 
 

 (3.3) 
The term  tang   is the gravitational acceleration. For uphill track gradients, 
where h2 ≥ h1, gravity assists deceleration. Examples on the calculation of the 
braking distance are given in figure 3.3 [60]. 
d1 = 1200m d2 = 300m
STOP
d1 = 1200m d2 = 300m
 %2
STOP
(a)
 %2
 %2
 %2
(b)
grad1 = 50
grad2 = -50
 
Figure 3.3 : Average gradient concept and limitations [60]. 
The calculation of the average gradient (G) for the path given in figure 3.3 (a) is as 
follows: 
 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
,  
1200 300
83.33 %1.2
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50 50
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G D d d d
dd d
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  

 
   
   
   
 (3.4) 
In figure 3.3 (b), the braking distance of a train going with 80 km/h speed and -0.3 
m/s
2
 acceleration rate is calculated by, 
  
2 2
2 tan
V U
S
a g 



 (3.5) 
where V
2
 is the final speed of the train. By using (3.5), the braking distance can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
  
220 80 3.6
591 m.
2 0.3 9.79 /83.33
S

 
 
 (3.6) 
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The speed of the train at the change of gradient so as to stop at the stop point can be 
also calculated by using (3.3), 
  300 2 0.3 9.79*0.02 300 7.9 m/s.U       (3.7) 
The distance to slow down to 7.9 m/s from 80 km/h is: 
 
  
22
300
7.9 80 3.6
435 m.
2 0.3 9.79*0.02
Braking distance  435 300 735m
S

 
 
  
 (3.8) 
In all the above equations, brake delay term is ignored. By considering the brake 
delay time in the above equations and assuming that the gradient is constant, the 
braking distance can be calculated as follows [60]: 
 
  
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d d
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U bt t
S Ut g
a g



    
 
 (3.9) 
where 
 S : is the stopping distance (m), 
 U : is the speed of the train when brake command was received (m/s),  
 a : is the acceleration provided by the braking system (m/s2), 
 g : is the acceleration due to gravity (9.79 m/s2), 
 td : is the train’s brake delay time (sec). 
Moreover, a braking distance calculation given by UIC 546 [62] is as follows: 
 
2
%
1.09375 0.127 0.235
100
V
S
i


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 
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 
 
(3.10) 
where 
 S : is the stopping distance (m), 
 V : is the speed of the train (km/h), 
 %λ : is the braking efficiency (has no physical meaning),  
 i : is the gradient (%), 
 Φ : is the speed dependent constant. 
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If there is a constant deceleration, the deceleration value can be determined by using 
2
2
V
a
S
  (3.11) 
Using (3.10) in (3.11) the following equation is obtained: 
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(3.12) 
where 
 S : is the stopping distance (m), 
 V : is the speed of the train (km/h), 
 ac : is the constant acceleration value (m/s
2
), 
 Φc : is the mean value of Φ.  
In moving-block systems, more than one train can occupy the same railway block by 
leaving adequate following distance between them. This following distance can be 
calculated as the sum of the safe stopping distance, safety margin and the distance 
corresponding to the brake reaction time. The difference between the fixed-block and 
the moving-block systems are given in figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 : Fixed-block vs. moving-block 
An example braking curve calculation is given in figure 3.5 for a high-speed train 
with 300km/h speed [61]. 
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Figure 3.5 : Stopping distance calculation for a high-speed train. 
In figure 3.5, I and P represents the supervision limits. For the I supervision limit, a 
predetermined time is given to the driver to act for the service brake so that the train 
does not pass the permitted speed limit. For the P supervision limit, a predetermined 
time is given to the driver after the train reaches to overspeed to act for the service 
brake so that the train will not overpass the point beyond which ETCS will trigger 
the command of the brakes [64]. The braking curve related to the speed decrease due 
to the emergency brake is called EBD (Emergency Brake Deceleration) curve. The 
shape of the EBD curve, for a given piece of track, will therefore vary according to 
the type of rolling stock. The EBI (Emergency Brake Intervention) supervision limit 
is the point in which ETCS will bypass the human in charge [64]. 
In addition to [64], several train braking distance calculations can be found in the 
literature [65-68]. Other practical safe stopping distance calculations explained in 
[69] are Moving Space Block (MSB), Moving Time Block (MTB) and Pure Moving 
Block (PMB). These safe stopping distance calculations are as follows [70]: 
 
2
max
max
2
*
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s
r
v
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SM T v
 
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 (3.13) 
 
max
2
f
MTB
s
v v
d SM
a
   (3.14) 
 
2
2
f
PMB
s
v
d SM
a
   (3.15) 
where 
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 dMSB : is the safe stopping distance between two trains for MSB, 
 dMTB : is the safe stopping distance between two trains for MTB, 
 dPMB : is the safe stopping distance between two trains for PMB,  
 vmax : is the maximum speed (km/h), 
 vf : is the speed of the rear train (km/h), 
 as : is the deceleration of the rear train (m/s
2
), 
 SM : is the marginal distance (m), 
 Tr : is the react time (sec). 
3.4 Proposed speed control method for moving-block systems 
In this section, the control mechanism proposed in [71] is improved with the use of 
an adaptive online learning algorithm and applied to the speed control of the trailing 
train so as to conserve the adequate following distance between trains. In addition to 
PMB calculation given by (3.15), the following train dynamics are used in simulation 
studies [72]. 
   
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   
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 
  
    

 (3.16) 
where 
  , fF g v  : is the traction force (N), 
  , fP g v  : is the total traction power (W), 
 Rg : is the gradient resistance (N), 
 Rr : is the rolling resistance (N), 
 vf : is the speed of the train (km/h), 
 a : is the acceleration value (m/s2), 
 grad : is the gradient of the railway line (%), 
 M : is the mass of the train (tons), 
 b : is the flange coefficient of the train between 0.0914 and 0.137, 
 n : is the total number of axles. 
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3.4.1 Suggested adaptive PD controller based on online LSSVR 
This section explains the online adaptive algorithm and the design of proposed PD 
controller. Given a training data set: 
   1 1, ..... , , , 1,2,...,
n
kky x y x x R y R k N    (3.17) 
where N is the size of the training data set and n is the dimension of the input matrix, 
respectively. The main aim is to find a function  f x  that has at most   deviation 
from the targets yi for all training data and as flat as possible [73]. The errors are 
ignored if they are less than  . A linear regression function  f x  has the form, 
  ,  with ,  nf x w x b w R b R     (3.18) 
where . ,  .  denotes the dot product in R
n
.  
The solution for this training data set can be found by the minimum of the following 
optimization problem [73], [74]: 
 
2
, ,
1
1 1
min
2 2
N
T
k
w b e
k
w w C e

   (3.19) 
subject to 
  0 , 1,2,....,Tk k ky w x b e k N       (3.20) 
where w is a vector in feature space R, C is a regularization parameter that provides a 
compromise between the model complexity and the degree of tolerance to the errors 
larger than  ,  kx  is a mapping from input space to the feature space and b is the 
bias term. In LSSVR, it is aimed to find the global solution by maximizing the 
geometric margin and minimizing the training error. The minimization problem 
presented in (3.19) and (3.20) are called the primal form of the optimization problem 
given in [73] and [74]. Since the objective function in (3.19) is non-convex, dual 
form for the problem ensuring global minima, can be derived using Lagrangian (L) 
function. 
    2
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1 1
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2 2
N N
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k k k k k
k k
L w b e w w C e w x b e y 
 
         (3.21) 
52 
where 
k  are the Lagrangian multipliers. For optimality, primal variables have to 
vanish at the saddle point: 
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 (3.22) 
As a result of dual formulation, the optimal solution of the problem can be obtained 
as follows: 
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with 
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 (3.24) 
The solution in (3.23) is the solution that can be utilized in online learning processes 
by introducing a time index as in (3.25): 
0 1
0
1
n
T T
nkm n
b
I
y
C

 
             
 
 (3.25) 
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The dynamics of a non-linear system, can be represented by the Nonlinear 
AutoRegressive with eXogenous inputs (NARX) model as in (3.27), 
 1,.., , ,..,u yn n n n n n ny f u u y y    (3.27) 
where un is the control input applied to the plant at time n, yn is the output of the 
plant , and nu and ny stand for the number of past control inputs and the number of 
past plant outputs involved in the model, respectively [71], [75]. The state vector of 
the system at time index n is represented as follows: 
1,.., , ,..,u yn n n n n n nc u u y y  
 
   (3.28) 
The output of the model can be written by using equations (3.25), (3.27) and (3.28), 
   
1
ˆ ,
n
L
nn i i n
i
y n K c x b

   (3.29) 
where  ,
nn i
K c x  is a kernel function given by      ,
n n
T
n ni iK c x c x  . The 
kernel function handles the inner product in the feature space. Detailed information 
on the online identification procedure of nonlinear systems via online LSSVR can be 
found in [76-78]. The adaptation mechanism proposed in [71] has been applied so as 
to conserve the following distance between two trains. 
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Figure 3.6 : Online adaptive PD controller based on LSSVR. 
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The adaptive structure for PD controller is illustrated in figure 3.6, where Xb is back 
train, Xf is the position of the leading train, Xbd is the bra the position of the king 
distance, and Xerror is the tracking error. The adaptive PD controller consists of four 
parts: an incremental PD controller, an online LSSVR model of the plant, a line 
search block (where the golden section algorithm was used) and two jacobian blocks. 
PMB calculation given by (3.15), is used to calculate the braking distance of the rear 
train. 
The classical incremental PD controller produces a control signal as follows [71], 
[79]. 
   1 1 1 22n nn n p n n d n n nu u K e e K e e e          (3.30) 
where 2
n n nn f b f bd
e x x L x    . 
np
K  and 
nd
K  are the controller parameters to be 
tuned. The controller parameters are not at optimal values initially. Owing to this, 
Online LSSVR model of the plant is utilized to predict the system jacobian 
information needed to tune controller parameters. The model produces a trajectory 
vector 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
n n n Kb b b
v v v
  
 
   that is composed of K-step ahead future behavior of 
the plant when the output of the PD controller is repeatedly applied to the plant 
exactly K times [71]. Based on these predictions, parameters of the controller are 
updated in a manner such that the sum of the squared K-step ahead prediction errors 
is minimized with minimum deviation in the control action [71]. The objective 
function to be minimized is selected as: 
2 2
1 1
1
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) [ 2 ] [ ]
2 2n k n k n k
K
n f b f bd n n
k
E u x x L x u u
   

       (3.31) 
where K is the prediction horizon and λ is the penalty coefficient. The second term in 
the summation in (3.31) is used to restrict the deviation of the control signal. 
Levenberg-Marquardt [80], [81] algorithm has been utilized to tune the controller 
parameters as in (3.32). 
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where µ is a parameter that yields a compromise between the steepest descent and 
the Gauss-Newton algorithms [71], I is 2x2 identity matrix, J is a (K+1)x2 Jacobian 
matrix given by (3.33). 
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and ˆ
errorX is prediction error vector given by (3.34). 
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ2
n n n n
n K n K n K n K
e f b f bd
error
e f b f bd
n n
x x x L x
x x x L x
u u 
   
   
     
   
   
      
   
       
X  (3.34) 
In order to eliminate drawbacks resulting from modeling inaccuracies in transient-
state and external disturbance in steady-state and to force system toward the desired 
reference, a control signal correction term ( 1nu  ) has been proposed in [71]. The 
corrector term is computed using gradient vector as follows: 
1
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 (3.35) 
where 
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The Jacobian matrix can be split up into two blocks and calculations can be 
simplified by using chain rule. 
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Control signal corrector term and controller parameters can be easily obtained by 
computing Jm and Jc. 
3.4.2 Simulation results 
The performance of the online adaptive PD controller is evaluated on a moving-
block train system. The main aim is to keep the trains safely away from each other. 
Firstly, it is assumed that there is no measurement noise or any disturbances applied 
to the system. Secondly, measurement noise and disturbances are also added to the 
system. These simulations are made for fixed prediction horizon (K) and penalty 
constant (λ) values, which are chosen as 3 and 0.25, respectively. As mentioned 
before, to provide a comfortable journey acceleration values have to be between -1.2 
and 1.2 ms
-2
 which is also satisfied in the simulation studies. The initial values of the 
PD controller parameters are chosen to be equal to zero, the number of the past 
inputs (nu) and outputs (ny), which are the order of NARX model, have been selected 
as 3. The length of the sliding window, which is also the number of the online 
training data pair, is chosen as 25. The length of each train is assumed as 200 m and 
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the initial distance between trains is 1500 m. The mass of the train is chosen as 100 
tons, the flange coefficient is chosen as 0.13, the number of axles are chosen as 6. 
Additionally, for the calculation of the braking distance of the rear train, the 
maximum deceleration is chosen as 1.4 m/s
2
, the reaction time is chosen as 2.5 sec 
and the maximum allowed speed is chosen as 110 m/s. 
3.4.2.1 Noiseless case 
Firstly, it is assumed that there is no measurement noise or any disturbances affecting 
the system. Simulations for the noiseless case are realized for fixed prediction 
horizon (K) and penalty constant (λ), which are chosen as 3 and 0.25, respectively. 
The simulation results are given in figure 3.7, figure 3.8, figure 3.9, figure 3.10 and 
figure 3.11, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.7 : The change of velocity (VRr: Velocity of the rear train, VL: Velocity of 
the leading train) and acceleration value of the rear train (aR) with 
respect to time. 
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Figure 3.8 : The change of velocity (VRr: Velocity of the rear train, VL: Velocity of 
the leading train) and acceleration value of the rear train (aR) with 
respect to position. 
 
Figure 3.9 : The change of FD, BD and the difference between FD and BD with 
respect to time. 
Figure 3.7 (and figure 3.8) indicates the velocities of the trains and the control signal 
(aR) applied to the rear train versus time and position, respectively and it is obvious 
from figure 3.7 and figure 3.8 that the adaptive PD controller attains good tracking 
performance for the noiseless case. The acceleration of the rear train (the control 
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signal produced by the adaptive PD controller) is within the limits for a comfortable 
journey. 
 
Figure 3.10 : The change of FD, BD and the difference between FD and BD with 
respect to position. 
 
Figure 3.11 : Kp, Kd values of the PD controller. 
The position between trains called following distance (FD) is bigger than the braking 
distance (BD) of the rear train, that is, the rear train preserve the FD during journey. 
The following distance between trains is also kept for the noiseless case (see figure 
3.9 and figure 3.10). Finally, the adaptation of the controller parameters are depicted 
in figure 3.11. 
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3.4.2.2 Noisy case with disturbances 
Secondly, in order to evaluate the robustness of the controller with respect to 
measurement noise and input disturbances; the measured velocity of the rear train is 
corrupted by an additive zero mean Gaussian noise. The K and the λ are chosen as 3 
and 0.25, as before. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the additive noise is 40 dB. 
Moreover, step type disturbances are added to the control signal at some time 
intervals. SNR is given by the following equation 
2
10 2
10log ( )
y
SNR dBa



  (3.38) 
where 2
y  and 
2
  are the variances of the measured output of the underlying system 
and the additive noise, respectively [71]. Simulation results for noisy case with step 
and sinusoidal type disturbance are given in figure 3.12, figure 3.13, figure 3.14, 
figure 2.15 and figure 3.16, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.12 : The change of velocity (VL: Velocity of the leading train, VRm: 
Measured velocity of the rear train, VRr: Output velocity of the rear 
train) and acceleration (aR) with respect to time. 
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Figure 3.13 : The change of velocity (VL: Velocity of the leading train, VRm: 
Measured velocity of the rear train, VRr: Output velocity of the rear 
train) and acceleration (aR) with respect to position. 
 
Figure 3.14 : The change of velocity (VL: Velocity of the leading train, VRm: 
Measured velocity of the rear train, VRr: Output velocity of the rear 
train) and acceleration (aR) with respect to time. 
As can be seen from the simulation results in figure 3.12, figure 3.13 and figure 3.14, 
the designed controller also provides a good tracking performance and the 
disturbances are also rejected in an acceptable short time. The acceleration of the rear 
train is also within the limits for a comfortable journey. 
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Figure 3.15 : The change of FD, BD and the difference between FD and BD with 
respect to time. 
 
Figure 3.16 : The change of FD, BD and the difference between FD and BD with 
respect to position. 
The safe following distance between trains is also kept for the noisy case. Since the 
noise is added to the measured velocity of the rear train, the effect of the noise is also 
decreased while calculating the braking distance of the rear train (please see figure 
3.6). 
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3.5 Results and Discussion 
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is the combination of 
European Train Control System (ETCS) and GSM-R. ERTMS is a unique standard 
which is developed to combine different national standards in Europe. ERTMS also 
became a world-wide standard. The application levels of ETCS and the differences 
between the fixed-block signaling systems and the moving-block signaling systems 
are explained in this section. Calculation of train braking distance (or safe stopping 
distance) and its effect on safe movement of trains as moving-blocks are also 
mentioned in this section. 
Additionally, an online adaptive PD controller design is realized for speed control of 
two consecutive trains. Simulation results by considering the braking distance and 
the dynamic train equations are also given. The robustness/success of the proposed 
online controller is also tested by adding measurement noise and input disturbance. 
The simulation results show that the proposed online controller is successful in 
disturbance rejection and provides robustness against the measurement noises. A 
disadvantage of the designed controller is the complexity of the controller structure. 
For instance due to the need of the inverse transform of the Jacobian matrix in the 
calculation of PD parameters, selecting a larger value of parameter K (the prediction 
horizon) leads to increase the computational complexity. This type of controller is 
not appropriate systems with short time constants. 
A theoretical framework for proving the satisfactory performance of the proposed 
controller as well as designing controllers for multiple trains in the same railway line 
where train characteristics such as mass and gradient are assumed as uncertain 
parameters and the stability analysis of the proposed controller can be considered as 
future works. 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
Since the railway systems are regarded as safety-critical systems and its signaling 
system ensures the safety of travel and transportation, the design steps have to be 
carried out very carefully. The recommendations of the railway-related safety 
standards, the general safety aspects accepted by all over the world and regional 
safety criteria must be taken into account while designing a signaling software or 
namely the interlocking software. By considering the above definitions and the need 
for the development of railway signaling systems in Turkey, the pioneer project 
named as the Turkish National Railway Signaling Project in cooperation with the 
Turkish State Railways and TUBITAK is realized. 
In this thesis, the basic concepts of the railway signaling systems that can be 
classified into two main topics known as fixed-block and moving-block railway 
signaling systems are discussed. The interlocking software development of the 
TRNSP and the problems encountered during this process is mentioned. A new 
voting strategy is proposed to solve these problems. Moreover, to provide the safe 
follow-up procedure in moving-block systems, an existing online adaptive controller 
design method is applied to control the speed of the trains. 
To summarize, the investments on railways in Turkey have increased much more 
than in previous periods. International agreements such as deployment of European 
Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), Turkish State Railways and so 
development of railway systems in Turkey accelerated. These investments also lead 
private construction companies to work on railway signaling systems. Finally, by 
completion of the Marmaray tunnel project, Europe and Asia were connected 
together. Within this perspective, developing original, reliable and fail-safe 
interlocking systems, which constitute one of the most vital parts of the railway 
signaling systems, is of great importance for Turkey. Construction of the railways 
compatible with ERTMS still continues and the Turkish Government has already 
planned new investments for future extensions. 
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